In the middle cases of absolute and necessary

iii.1 On mixed syllogisms with absolute and necessary

قد قلنا في هذه القواعد: إذا كانت مطلقة وإذا كانت ضرورية.

[3.1.1] We have already spoken about these syllogisms when they consist of absoluteness propositions and when they consist of necessity propositions.

{Prior Anal i.9, 30a15.}

وبقيت المختلطات من الضررين في حلة ما بقي. فلنكن في المختلطات إذا كانت

Among the remaining cases there are the syllogisms that consist of a mixture of the two kinds of proposition. So let us talk about the mixed syllogisms where

إحدى مقدماتها مطلقة والأخرى ضرورية.

one of the premises is an absoluteness proposition and the other is a necessity proposition.

ولنبدأ بالضرب الأول من الشكل

[3.1.2] Let us begin with the first mood in

الأول الذي من كليتين موجبتين صغراهما مطلقة وكبراهما ضرورية. مثله كله جـ

The first mood is when both premises are affirmative and one of them is necessary and the other is absolute.

For example, we will consider the first mood.
first figure, which has two universally quantified affirmative premises, with
the minor premise an absoluteness proposition and the major premise a ne-
cessity proposition. For example:

Every $C$ is a $B$, i.e. with absoluteness;
(1) and every $B$ is an $A$ with necessity.
Then we say: Every $C$ is an $A$ with necessity.

أي بالإطلاق، وكَلَّ $B$ بالضرورة. فنقول: إنَّ $C$ أ بالضرورة،
و نقول أولًا: إنَّا قد كنا نأخذ المطلقة فيما سلف عامة م بالضرورة ولا ليست

[3.1.3] Our first comment is that we have been taking ‘absolute proposi-
tion’ in the above as including both necessary propositions and

بالضرورة، وإذا أخذناها الآن كذلك إختلط، فما كان من ذلك يوافق مادة
propositions that are not necessary. When we take them like that now, they
form mixtures. Some of them correspond to necessary matter;
{So what does an absoluteness proposition say? }

الضرورة كان حكمها حكم الضرورة، وما يوافق مادة لا ضرورة فيها إختلف.
these are the ones whose content is necessary. Some of them correspond to
non-necessary matter; these are different.

فليعن هناأ بالملقات، ما كان من المطلقات غير ضروري. فما كان يلزم من
By ‘absolute’ let us mean here those absolute propositions that are not ne-
cessity propositions. When the mixture of an absoluteness proposition with
a necessity one
entails a necessary conclusion, you know that the mixture is tantamount to the mixture of a necessity proposition and a general absoluteness proposition.

In the case where it entails an absolute conclusion, you know that if you take [the premises] as general [absoluteness] propositions, then what follows is a general absoluteness proposition, and no necessity proposition follows. [In each case] the distance [travelled by the syllogism] will be minimal. In fact if a general absoluteness premise entails [with the other premise] a necessity proposition, then each individual instance of it is true, and so each special case [of the conclusion] holds as an individual case under the general.

[3.1.4] We say: People have been surprised that this conclusion is a necessity proposition and they have regarded this way of reasoning as implausible. There is just one thing that misleads them, namely that they reckon that the necessary in this case is anything that is necessary for so long as the essence of the subject individual continues to be satisfied,

{Here Ibn Sīnā gives evidence for what he says at Burhān 123.14ff and elsewhere, that essential and descriptional propositions are counted as absolute in Qiyās but necessary in Burhān. The point here is that descriptional propositions don’t behave like necessary ones in this kind of argument. It’s not clear what he has against essential propositions here. A common view}
today is that the temptation to reject this mixed mood comes from reading the modalities as de dicto. But Ibn Sinā is emphatic that de dicto modalities should not be mentioned in the same breath as the Aristotelian modal syllogisms, e.g. Qiyās 142.13f. A further point: his complaint is in part that people don’t distinguish the essential from the descriptional, cf. 126.14ff below. This confirms that Theophrastus, Themistius etc. had an ambiguous formulation.

Every white thing has with necessity a colour that opens out to the eye.

(2) With necessity nothing white is black.

they reckon it is a genuine necessity proposition. But when

قالوا: زيد أبيض، وكل أبيض فهو بالضرورة ذو لون مفوق للبصر، لم ينطق

they say

Zayd is white;

(4) and everything white is necessarily of a colour that opens out to the eye.

it doesn’t entail

لهم: أنَّ زيدا ذو لون مفوق للبصر بالضرورة، وإلا فزيد أبيض بالضرورة.

for them that

(5) Zayd is of a colour that opens out to the eye, with necessity.

since that would say that Zayd is white with necessity.
So likewise for them it would just follow from (3) [and the necessity of the conclusion of this mood] that

(6) Zayd is not black, with necessity.

وَكَلْ حَذَا لَأَنْهُمْ لَيْكُمْ بِإِسْتِنبُلٍ حَقِيقَةَ القُوْلُ عَلَيّ الْكَلَّ قُوْلًا ضَرْوِيًّا.

All this is because they don’t take the trouble to establish the facts about universally quantified propositions that are necessity propositions.

[If they did,] they would realise the difference between [two meanings of]

(7) Everything white is, with necessity, of a colour that opens out to the eye.

إِذْ مَعَانَاهُ مَا يُوسِفْ بِأَيْضَ، كِيفُ وَضْفُ بَأْتَ أَيْضَ، فَإِنَّهُ مَا دَامَ ذَاتَهُ مُوجُودًا.

[The first case is] when its meaning is that whatever thing fits the description ‘white’, regardless of how that description is given, and so long as the essence of the thing continues to be satisfied,

{NB Explication by expansion.}

كَانَ أَيْضَ أَوْ لَمْ يَكُنْ أَيْضَ، فَهُوَ ذَوُو لَونٍ مُفْرَقٍ لِلْبَصَرَ. أَوْ كِلَّ ما يُوسِفْ بِأَيْضَ أَيْضَ

and regardless of whether or not it is white [at the time], that thing has a colour that opens out to the eye. The other [meaning is that] everything that fits the description ‘white’
in any way, for as long as it remains white, has with necessity a colour which opens out to the eye; or [that every such thing, for as long as it remains white,] is with necessity not black. You know from the discussion above that you can tell the two interpretations apart by the obvious fact that the first of them

\{
\text{At `Ibāra 115.11 Ibn Sīnā describes a criterion for distinguishing interpretations (viz. one of them can be doubted but the other can’t). But this criterion wasn’t used to distinguish necessary from wasfy-with-necessary-predicate as here. }
\}

is false.

 ولو كانوا قالوا في كباراهم: إنَّ كُلَّ أبيض بالضرورة فهو ذو لون

[3.1.5] If they had made their major premise 127.3

Everything that is white with necessity, that thing has a colour which opens out to the eye with necessity.

\{NB Quantification over modalised subject; the mode is necessity. \}

فِرْقَةٌ للبَصَرِ بالضرورة، لَكَنْ أَيْضًا حَقّاً. لَكَنْ لَمْ يَكُنْ أَلْحَقُ الأوَسْطِ حينَذٍ

then that too would be true. But the middle term in that case is not

\{I can’t interpret the ‘ihq. Is it ‘the truth’ or ‘attached’? \}

مشتركاً فيه؛ وذلك لَّأنَّ الأَبيِض بالضرورة ليس مَحْوَلاً على زيد، بل الأَبيِض

common [to the two premises], because what is predicated of Zayd [in the minor premise] is not ‘white with necessity’ but ‘white

الَّذِي ليس بالضرورة أو الأَبيِض بِلا شرط، فإن حذفوا هذه الزيادة كانت without necessity’ or ‘white’ without any condition. If they suppressed this addition

الكبيرى كاذبة. لأنك لا تمكنك أن تقول: إنَّ كُلَّ أبيض بالضرورة أو بغير.
the major premise would be false, because you can’t say that

(9) Everything that with or without necessity is white has a colour that opens out to the eye with necessity.

When you say ‘Every white thing’, that includes both [things that are necessarily white and things that are white without necessity]

جمعاً، فلا يمكن أن نقول: كل أبيض فهو بالضرورة ذو لون مفَّقر للبصر.

together, so we can’t say

(10) Every white thing has with necessity a colour which opens out to the eye.

لكن المادة المجازية هي التي غلطته.

But the custom of using words in extended senses is what causes the error. 127.10

{Cf. ‘Ibāra 101.7 on the ‘ādatu l-majāziyya and Aristotle’s attitude to it. Also Qiyās 67.9 on extended senses of ‘necessary’.}

[3.1.6] So when we say

(11) Every C is a B.

and then we say

ما هو B بالضرورة أو بعيد الضرورة بعد أن يكون B كان وقتًا ما أو دائمًا

Everything that is either with necessity or without necessity a B,

(12) given that it is a B, regardless of whether that is temporarily or permanently, is an A with necessity and permanently.

فهو أ بالضرورة دائمًا، دخل ج في المقول على الكلّ.

then [it follows that] C is included in whatever is said of every [B]. Likewise when we say

(13) Every B [is a C].
as an absoluteness proposition which includes both cases together, then it has to be that

(14) Every $C$ is an $A$ with necessity.

[3.1.7] The second mood is the same [as the first], except that the major premise is the one that is an absoluteness premise, and it entails an absoluteness conclusion. An example is

Every $C$ is a $B$ with necessity;
and every $B$ is an $A$ with absoluteness;
so every $C$ is an $A$ with absoluteness.
This is because it is given that everything that is a $B$ is with absoluteness an $A$, regardless of whether it is a $B$ with or without necessity. So 

$\forall b, a \in A$ with absoluteness.

[3.1.8] It is not correct that the meaning of the absoluteness premise is that everything that is a $B$ is an $A$ with absoluteness. {In this paragraph he examines various possible refinements of the mood just stated. They take the form of narrowing the major premise; since the mood is valid, they will therefore be valid too. I don’t know why he doesn’t just say this. Odd also that the rest of the paragraph seems to be based on the assumption that the major premise is a descriptional, which is certainly not required for validity.}

but only for as long as it is a $B$, not permanently. That is because not every-thing that is a $B$

fails to be a $B$ permanently. In fact we have said [in the minor premise] that something that is a $B$, namely what is a $C$, is a $B$

with necessity and permanently. In the light of this it is not correct for us to say

Everything that fits the description $B$ is an $A$ at some time, namely the time during which it fits the description $B$.}

In fact [given the minor premise] some of what fits the description
B fits that description permanently. It can be that this [major] premise is true absolutely, with the kind of absoluteness that allows the premise to be either a necessary truth or not one. Thus when we say

(17) Everything that moves changes.

it is not correct

أن نقول: إنه متحرك بالضرورة، ولا ما دام متحركًا وليس دائمًا: بل في وقت

for us to say

[Everything that moves] changes with necessity, not while it continues to move, nor permanently, but for the non-permanent amount of time during which it does move.

This is because some moving things have a permanently moving essence and some

لا يدوم؛ وكذلك يكون بعضه متحركًا بالضرورة، وبعض لا بالضرورة. فلا يصح don’t. Likewise some moving things change with necessity, and some moving things change but not with necessity. Nor is it correct

أن نقول: إن الكئ كذلك بالضرورة، ولا إن الكئ كذلك لا بالضرورة: بل

for us to say

(19) Everything that moves changes with necessity.

nor

(20) Everything that moves changes without necessity.

Instead we should say that the premise holds

نقول: مطلقا. ويكون الإطلاق العام. فإذا صدقت هذه المقدمة على هذه الصفة, absolutely; this is an example of broad absoluteness. But then if this premise is true when read as a broad absoluteness proposition,
so that every $B$ is an $A$ with this kind of absoluteness, the conclusion follows, and moreover it is

necessarily an absoluteness proposition. This is because this conclusion will hold as the same kind of absolute as the major premise, i.e. broad absolute.

{Appalling exegesis to use $daru\text{-}riyyatan$ this way, if my translation is correct.}

Thus every $C$ will be an $A$ so long as it continues to fit the description $B$. But [by the minor premise] it permanently fits the description $B$, so it is permanently
129

له كونه أ. مثال ذلك: الثلج أبيض بالضرورة، وكل أبيض فإنه ملون بلون
an A. An example of this is:

Snow is white with necessity;
and everything white is coloured with a colour which opens out
to the eye, with the absoluteness that we said;
so all snow is coloured with a colour that opens out to the eye,
permanently.

{NB Here he uses ‘permanently’ and ‘with necessity’ as synonyms.}

فيتمل هذا من يعجب من إنتاج الضرورة عن صغرى مطلقة وكبيرة ضرورية.
Anyone who is surprised at getting a necessity conclusion from an abso-
luteness minor premise and a necessity major premise should take a close
look at this.

فإنَّه يجد الضرورة تنتج عن كبرى مطلقة إذا كانت الصغرى ضرورية.
He will find a necessity proposition derived from an absoluteness major
premise when the minor premise is a necessity proposition.

[3.1.9] The third mood: Its minor premise is a universally quantified 129.5
affirmative absoluteness proposition and its major premise is a universally
quantified negative necessity proposition.

مثاله: كل ج B بالاطلاق، ولا شيء من ج A بالضرورة. ينتج بالضرورة
For example:

Every C is a B with absoluteness;
and no B is an A, with necessity.
It follows that with necessity no C is an A.

[It behaves] as you have already learned.
{I.e. for the first mood.}
[3.1.10] The fourth mood is the same but with the necessity and the absoluteness the other way round:

Every $C$ is a $B$ with necessity;
and no $B$ is an $A$, with absoluteness.
It entails: No $C$ is an $A$.

It behaves as you have learned

for the second mood.

[3.1.11] The fifth mood: its minor premise is an existentially quantified affirmative absoluteness proposition, and its major premise is a universally quantified affirmative necessity proposition.

[3.1.12] The sixth mood is the same but with the necessity and the absoluteness the other way round.

[3.1.13] The seventh mood: its minor premise is an existentially quantified affirmative absoluteness proposition, and its major is a negative universally quantified necessity proposition.

[3.1.14] The eighth mood is the same but with the necessity and the absoluteness the other way round. Its conclusions take their form from the major premise.
[3.1.15] Know that an existentially quantified absoluteness proposition doesn’t say that [its content] is not necessary, and an existentially quantified necessity proposition doesn’t say that [its content] is not absolute.

فإنَّ الحرفين إذا كنا نشاّم في السلب والإيجاب فكيف [لا] تتماناع

In fact, given that neither the negative nor the affirmative existentially quantified propositions place such a restriction, how can we suppose that when they don’t place such a restriction

either when they are necessity propositions or when they are absoluteness propositions, they still deny that [their content] has the meaning referred to in our discussion of the second mood?

{I take him to be saying that the existentially quantified propositions are compatible with the descriptioal reading, and using as evidence the fact already discussed, that they are compatible with the content being absolute and with its being necessary. This requires adding a lat in line 130.2 without ms evidence, but noting that one ms omits the earlier lat in the same context earlier in the line. }

[Second figure]

وأما الشكل الثاني، فاحقّ فيه أنه إذا اختلتك القضبان في الضرورة والإطلاق

[3.1.16] We consider the second figure. The truth about it is that when the two propositions differ in that one is a necessity proposition and the other is a narrow absoluteness

{Prior Anal i.10, 30b7. But he starts with new material and picks up Aristotle only at 131.7. }

الخاص، وكتانتا كتبتين، فقيل الأوسط بالضرورة على كلّ واحد من طرف،

proposition, and they are both universally quantified, then the middle term is applied, with necessity, to all the individuals under one of the extreme terms,

ثمّ قبل على كلّ واحد من الطرف الآخر بغير ضرورة، على ما جوزه صاحب

and then it is applied to all the individuals under the other extreme term

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but not with necessity, according to what was allowed by a person given to
detailed analysis. So for one of the two extreme terms, the content of the
middle term applies to everything that satisfies the extreme term, and it
applies to it

دائم له، وعلى الآخر هو أنه ليس دائمًا له أيّ كلٍّ واحد واحد منه، كان
permanently; and for the other extreme term, the middle term applies to
[each thing that satisfies the extreme term], but in each case it doesn’t apply
permanently.
{So he says. But does he mean it is not asserted to apply permanently? }

The content can be either denied or affirmed. In fact the extreme terms are
disjoint from each other, and each of them has to be denied of
{NB He is confused about whether the **hukm** includes the quality. In 130.7
the **hukm** was ‘the **hukm** of the middle term’, but now the **hukm** is either a
denial or an affirmation.}

الآخر. وكذلك إن كانت الصغير جزئيًا. فإنّ البعض الذي فيها مسلوب عن
the other. And likewise if the minor premise is existentially quantified, then
130.10 the ‘some’ which is in the minor premise is denied of

الطرف الأكبر؛ إذ كان ذلك البعض مخالفا له في الحكم.
the major extreme term, because this some and the major term are incompatible with respect to the content [in the middle term].

وأت إذا جعلت
130.11

[3.1.17] If you count
{NB Counting the modality as part of the predicate so as to form a syllo-
gism. Why? In any case it won’t work if the modalities in the two premises
are different (this being in second figure). }

دوامٍ وغير الدوام جزء من المحول فكان الإقتران، مثلًا قوله: كُلُّ حَـۚ بـ
the permanence or non-permanence as a part of the predicate, it forms a
premise-pair, as when you say

Every C is a B with necessity;
and every A is a B with necessity.
{Curious he chooses a non-productive premise-pair, twice. I suspect he was careless about the negations. }

بالضرورة، وكلّ ـ ـ بالضرورة، أو بالضرورة لا شيء من ـ ـ ،

or

With necessity no C is a B;

and no A is a B, where the negation applies to each individual but not with necessity.

If you do this, you could say

ما يقال له آœ، فيثب عليه أنه دائما ـ ـ. ولا شيء مما يقال له ـ يحمل عليه أنه

Everything which satisfies the phrase A has predicated of it that it is permanently a B;

and nothing which satisfies the phrase C has predicated of it that it is permanently a B; This entails that no C is an A.

دائمًا ـ ـ، فإنّه لاأي شيء من ـ ـ. وكذلك لو قلت كلّ ما يقال له

And likewise if you said

Everything which satisfies the phrase C is a thing of which it is permanently denied that it is a B;

and nothing which satisfies the phrase A is a thing of which it is permanently denied that it is a B; it follows that no A is a B, and that is with necessity.

{NB ‘say’ here seems to be a concrete individual, but I guess this is a straight quantifier usage. }
Then you can put a single noun in place of the phrase ‘thing of which it is denied etc.’. 

{NB Using a single noun as short for a phrase.}

In this way you can add the modality of necessity in all of this, and it entails a necessity proposition. 

{Presumably he is describing how modalities can be thought of as being added to assertoric syllogisms. ??}

Whenever you add a necessity to the syllogism, it means that the syllogism is not productive. And this means that the syllogism is not productive.

[3.1.18] When you take a general absoluteness proposition [as premise], the syllogism with two affirmative premises or two negative premises shouldn’t be productive, because {Read al-muṭlaqata l-ṭammata with one ms. Very possibly Ibn Sīnā intended this but wrote carelessly. The paragraph frankly looks like an unfinished note to himself. }

١٣١٥

أتمك أن تكون تلك المطلقة تصدق على ضرورية، وفي تلك المادّة لا تجب

أتمك أن تكون تلك المطلقة تصدق على ضرورية، وفي تلك المادّة لا تجب

outcome. And this means that the syllogism is not productive.

[3.1.19] Let us review precisely what is the the standard position about the second figure.

The first mood of the figure is:

على أ، فهو شيء، ذلك الشيء، يُسمى دائماً عنه أنه ب، أُنتج ليس أ ب، وذلك بالضرورة. فإذا أتمك أن يجعل بدل قولك شيء مسلوب عنه كما إما مفرداً.

{3.1.19} Let us review precisely what is the the standard position about the second figure.

The first mood of the figure is:
Every $C$ is a $B$ with absoluteness; 
and with necessity no $A$ is a $B$.

{Cesare. Proved as assertoric case, by converting major premise so as to get Celarent.}

It converts to the first figure, and thus it entails

No $C$ is an $A$.

{The conversion

This is uncontroversial. 
{I.e. given the controversial position that ‘No $B$ is an $A$, with necessity’ converts.}

Suppose [the major premise] is convertible, so that the premise and its converse are completely parallel.

Among non-necessary propositions, a proposition that converts can only be a kind of pure absolute, or its meaning is
that something was the case at some particular time, so that it converts in the way that was said.

{Reference back to ii.1, but I haven’t yet sorted out exactly where. }

[3.1.22] When the major premise is absolute in the first meaning, it was already known that when it converts, it becomes

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{No } B & \text{ is an } A \text{ at any time while it continues to fit the description } B. \\
\text{But [in (30)] every } C & \text{ is a } B \text{ permanently, and so as you know, the syllogism entails a necessity conclusion.}
\end{align*}
\]

{This is another example of the descriptional argument, though did he actually mention descriptional Celarent? }
[3.1.23] We turn to the second kind of convertible absolute proposition. The essence of the composed syllogism in this case is

Everything that in any point or interval of time is a \( C \) fits the description \( B \) permanently for as long as its essence continues to be satisfied, not just for as long as it continues to satisfy the description \( B \); and nothing that satisfies \( A \) at a certain time has \( B \) true of it.

This is supposed to prevent there being any \( C \) which is an \( A \) under the assumption that the negative proposition is factually true. Otherwise [there is such a \( C \), and] at every time in which its essence is satisfied, it satisfies \( B \), and this includes the time in question. But it is fair to say that it would not win approval if we were to convert this premise so as to compose a syllogism in the first figure along the lines

Everything that is a \( C \), under any circumstances, fits the description \( B \) permanently; and nothing that is a \( B \), under any circumstances, has \( A \) false of it at the given time.
The major premise

in (33), on my reckoning, isn’t an absolute of either of the two types [that we are considering]. [For an absolute major premise] one would have to say

كل ب موجود في هذا الوقت مسلوبا عنه أ. 

(34) Every B which exists at the given time has A false of it.

But it doesn’t follow from this that the class C is included in

{I think he probably means ‘Everything that exists and is a B at the given time’.}

[the subject class of the major premise], since it could be that the individual C doesn’t fit the description B at the given time, because its essence is not {For ‘the subject … major premise’ the text has ‘B’. This is probably Ibn Sinā writing carelessly.}

موجودا في هذا الوقت. فعلى طريقتهم - حينئذ لا تكون النتيجة مطلقة على

satisfied at that time. So if we did follow them in this line of reasoning, the conclusion would not be absolute, [because of the required] condition

وجود الموضوع. نعم إن كان ج موجودا في هذا الوقت فيسلب عنه أنه

about the existence of the subject individual. Granted, if the C exists at the given time then it is not {NB Here it’s explicit that he is discussing syllogisms with conditions added. In this line he seems to be returning to the form in 132.1, abandoning the pseudo-converse suggested in 132.10.}

أ في هذا الوقت، ولا يلزم أن يسلب عنه في كل وقت. مثلا إذا كان an A at that time, but it doesn’t follow that A is false of it at every time. For example if
the $C$ is permanently white, and it happens to be true at a certain time that nothing that is moving (i.e.

{Correcting the two Bs to As as required by the context. This could be Ibn Sīnā’s slip since he swapped $A$ and $B$ around a little earlier. }

NB There is something not being said here. If we can take ‘$A$ that exists at time $t$’ as a single term, then we have a straightforward Camestres and there is no need to examine the form of the condition. Consider in connection with the question where the line between core and adjunction is drawn. }

[3.1.24] So if all these things happen, then when they happen they entail this conclusion. But the facts of the matter don’t necessarily

The affair that conflicts these analogies. And indeed if at N\'on it were black, it would happen like that. Thus if we say:

(35) Every colour in the shade is with necessity a black colour.

{NB Because of the truth of the sentence, the quantification is over a singleton? No, because for Ibn S\'\'in\'a a ‘colour’ can be an instance of a colour. }

Then it happens that

(36) At a certain time, no colour of the heavenly bodies is a black colour.

So with this on this way of existence, we can see from this that it is an impermanent proposition. But ‘black’ doesn’t have to be false

{The ms that reads wa- for ‘id clearly has a point, though Ibn S\'\'in\'a is quite capable of writing ‘id. }

of things in the shade which exist at the given time in order for the proposition [(36)] to be true. In fact it could be that there are no things in the shade [at that time]

{Reading mawj\'udatan for wuj\'ud\'yatan; no ms support but I think the sense requires it, and one can see how a copyist retained wuj\'ud\' from the previous line. }

for ‘black’ to be false of. Also (36) doesn’t have to convert to the form

{NB Again the obstacle to converting lies in the choice of where to draw the line between core and condition. Reducing the core allows more kinds of inference but it may run into difficulties with inference types not recognised by Ibn S\'\'in\'a. }

ولا واحد ما هو سواد موجود هو لون الفلك. فرَّما لَم يَكِن حسِنَة سواد

23
Not one black colour in existence is the colour of the heavenly sphere.

It could be in this case that there is nothing black,

`موجود لأنَّهم يجوزون أن يقول القائل: ليس شيء من الألوان سوداء، أي` because they permit someone to say

No colour is black, i.e. at a certain time.

{‘They’: people in general, or specifically Aristotle or his tradition? }

Then it is true that

No colour in the heavens at that time is the colour black.

{I altered the order. But it seems to be needed at (133.10), since without the time incorporated in the proposition, there is no obstacle to converting. }

{NB The effect is that the time of evaluation becomes part of the proposition. }

And in this case the sentence is true and absolute. But then it doesn’t convert so as to reduce the syllogism to the first figure.

But one should say:

In fact this negative universally quantified proposition is true [anyway]. The condition that

the subject term is satisfied at the time only applies if the proposition is affirmative, because an affirmation about a determinate time
can only be true when its subject term is satisfied at that time, whereas a denial can be true when its subject term is satisfied

{NB Affirmative sentence with specific time attached to subject term is only about things existing at that time.}

and also when its subject term is unsatisfied. Thus a negative statement can state a truth about its subject term both when the subject term is satisfied and when it isn’t, and the truth can be about all times or about a specified time.

But the thing to consider is [not whether the subject term is satisfied but] whether what is asserted of the subject term is true. If [the proposition states that what is asserted] is true permanently then the proposition is a necessity proposition;

{NB The hukm here is clearly what is asserted of the subject term. Note also: his statement suggests he is talking about evaluating the proposition, but his example shows that in fact he is talking about what the proposition asserts about the truth of its core.}

if [it states that what is asserted] is true at a certain time, then it is an absolute impermanent proposition. So then if we say:

Every B, however it is, has A false of it at such-and-such a time.
the sentence [says that the negative assertion] is true at this time.
{NB True at a time?}

If at this time the term $B$ does not satisfy the description $A$, then regardless of whether there are or are not any $B$s,
{NB not [B] is satisfied but [THE B’s] is satisfied.}
The term doesn’t satisfy the description $A$. When there are no $Bs$, then the $Bs$ don’t satisfy the description $A$. When there are some $Bs$ and

...
Thus when we say

(42) Every $C$ is a $B$, with truth.

this can be understood as having either of two meanings.

أي كلاً بين المجموعتين كلاً هو حقٌّ، بعدما لم يجعل

[3.1.26] One of them is that if we say 134.8

(43) Every $C$ is a $B$.

that is in fact the truth, though it can’t be

{Where is the other? Also I read ‘an for ‘in.}

ذلك في نفس الأمر؛ لأنه ربما كذب هذا الحصر في وقت آخر.

أو ضروري، مثله أننا إذا قلنا في وقت من الأوقات لا يبيض فيه ولا حمرة ولا

شيء

or a necessary sense. An example is that when we say, at some time when there is no white colour and no red colour or colour

من الأوقات إن أمكن: إن كل لون فهو سواد، وصدق هذا في ذلك الوقت، ولم

intermediate [between white and black] (assuming this is possible):

(44) Every colour is black.

[In this meaning] this proposition would be true at that time, but not

{NB Here he explicitly uses a ‘possible’ time/situation.}

يمكن صدقا ضروريًا، لم يعني أن كل واحد متاح هو موضوع بأنه لون فانه موجود

a necessary truth. It would not be meant that every individual that fits the description ‘colour’ does have
{NB He seems to be saying that the proposition is (narrow) absolute, but nevertheless not an absoluteness proposition.}

له وجودا غير ضروري أنه سواد، حتى يجوز أن يبقى ذلك الواحد موجود

‘black colour’ true of it, though not necessarily true, so that that individual can continue to have its

الذات أو موجود لونا وقد زال عنه أنه سواد، حتى يكون كان حكمنا أيضا

essence instantiated, and be a colour, but cease to be black. That would be as if we had judged that
Each thing fitting the description ‘colour’ at that time is not black permanently and for as long as its essence continues to be satisfied — far from it!

So in fact the non-necessary truth of this sentence of ours just has to do with the position with the negative proposition has to be as we said. In fact if at some particular time no colour is white or intermediate [between black and white], and all colours are black and there is no [non-black] colour at all, it is true that

(46) No [non-black] colour is the colour white, at a certain time.
namely at that time.

This is because an unsatisfied [subject] doesn’t satisfy the description ‘white colour’ or have any affirmative property. When the affirmation is not true

the [corresponding] denial must be true. If we take care about what we say, and pay regard to the satisfaction of the truth

in the quantifier, it would be possible for us to convert this proposition.

If they were to follow the path I have presented, they would

know what to say and practice. They would avoid the approach that is like mine which you will have learned about if you have thought about

{I’m not at all sure that this translation is correct, or that the text is. The word al-mi’tl doesn’t convince.}

{NB Discover for themselves the many kinds of proposition.}

they would also discover for themselves the great number of different kinds of proposition, but also they would avoid the approach that is like mine which you will have learned about if you have thought about

some of what was explained to you earlier. Thus when we have

Every eclipse of the moon is a black colour.

and

No eclipse of the moon at time \( t \) is a black colour.

because there isn’t an eclipse of the moon [at time \( t \)],

{An eclipse is anyway an event, not a colour. So there is some stretching of language. In English we say that a dress ‘is a reddish colour’ etc.}

it becomes evident that at that time

the [corresponding] denial must be true. If we take care about what we say, and pay regard to the satisfaction of the truth

in the quantifier, it would be possible for us to convert this proposition.
then

(49) No eclipse of the moon at time $t$ is an eclipse [of the moon].

One gets in the same way that no person

{By assertoric Cesare.}

is a person, and likewise with all sorts of things. One shouldn’t comment that this means that no eclipse of the moon at time $t$ is an existing eclipse.

{Here he rejects a use of quantification over possibly nonexistent things; or is it over actual things that possibly don’t satisfy the subject description? It looks as if he rejects it because there is a simpler description, not because it’s incoherent in itself.}

The fact is that there aren’t any eclipses of the moon
When you take this major premise [(49)] as true. What one should say is rather:

In every topic, with negative absolute premises I only consider whether their predicate terms are

{Why does he explicitly say ‘absolute’?}

are true [of their subject terms] at that time, and on the strength of that the proposition is confirmed or denied; I don’t consider whether the subject term of the

negative proposition is satisfied. In future we will take this view for granted.

[3.1.29] We have been lengthy and repetitious about this topic, so as to give the student a feeling for what the topic is about, by presenting the many precautions that need to be taken into account when this approach is taken on board, even after the superfluous premises and modes have been disposed of. These are things that you have already learned. We say: Absolute propositions

of the kind under discussion can have consequences that are also absolute propositions of this kind.
It’s of no concern here whether the propositions in themselves are necessary or not necessary. Rather,

and some animal is human necessarily, and there are no other colours or other animals,

and only those colours that are black necessarily, thereby making it true that every animal

is a human, and every colour is black — [when all this holds] then the predication is necessary but the premise is not a necessary proposition. This is because the truth of the quantifier just happens to be the case and is absolute and not necessary. The truth of the sentence

Every animal is human.

illustrates this. So even though ‘human’ is necessarily true of every single one of those

things that fit the description ‘animal’, the truth of the quantifier is not a necessary truth.
[3.1.30] At the same time,
Every animal moves in act.

has to be necessary, since it has to be the case

that it is not concerned with the facts about the animals individually. Rather it is about the truth of the statement that every animal moves at some time or breathes at some time. This truth holds at every time.

{NB Nested temporal quantifiers.}

At whatever time you say

Every existing animal has movement — not while its essence continues satisfied, but rather whenever it moves.

it is true; this sentence is never false. I grant that there could be a time when not every animal is moving.

But (52) doesn’t contradict that. Even at the time when it is true that no animal is moving.

{NB laysa kullu. I think the sense requires here that kullu has the wider scope, though more usually it’s read the other way.}

at that same time it is also true that

Every animal moves or breathes at some time at which it exists.
This sentence [(53)] is true at every time, even if an animal is not moving at some time,


في وجوده، فإن هذا يصدق في كل وقت، وإن كان حيوان لا يتحرك في وقت,


اذ هذا لم يوجد الحركة في كل وقت. ويناقض بأن لا يكون حركة في وقت.


إذ هذا لم يوجد الحركة في كل وقت. ويناقض بأن لا يكون حركة في وقت.
since (53) doesn’t imply that there is movement at every time. It is contra-


137.10 icted by there not being movement at any time,


{Grammar! haraka with masculine verb! }


فباعري أن تكون هذه القضية الكبيرة ليست مطلقة. بل ضرورية.


so it’s reasonable to suppose that this universally quantified proposition


[(51)] is not absolute but necessary.


وهم


[3.1.31] But [the Aristotelians]


يأخذونها مطلقة، ولا يأخذونها ضرورية. البينة. وكذلك قولهم: كل متحرك.


take it as absolute, and not as necessary at all. Likewise the sentence


(54) Every moving thing changes.


should be not absolute but necessary. But one of them took it as absolute,


وصدق من حصول هذه قضية في الأول مطلقة، فتأتي نتيجة مطلقة. وأما لماذا


and declared that a person who took it as an absolute major premise in the


first figure, so as to derive an absolute conclusion, was right to do so. And

also what


{Reading sadaqa to get a plausible sense. }


يقولون في قول القائل: بعض الحيوان إنسان بالضرورة، وبعض اللّون سوان


do they say about someone who says the following?


137.15


(55) Some animal is a human with necessity, and some colour is black


with necessity.


بالضرورة؟ هل هي ضرورية أو مطلقة؟ لكنهم معترفون بأن هذه القضية


37
Is this proposition necessary or absolute? They recognise that this existentially quantified proposition

{NB I think it has to be ‘necessary’ rather than ‘necessity proposition’ here, because the proposition is explicitly a necessity proposition. Note the nested modality.}

الحُرِّيَّة يجب أن تكون صادقة في كل وقت، ونقيضها كاذبا في كل وقت.

has to be true at every time, and its contradictory negation is false at every time — but we find them

قد نسوا السور فهم غير ملتفتين إلى السور. وكذلك قولنا: بالضرورة ليس كل

forgetting the quantifier, so they are not reading it in terms of [truth of] the quantifier. The same goes when we say

(56) Necessarily not every animal is human.

حيوان إنسانا، فإنهم معتبرون بأن هذه القضية ضرورية. يجب أن يكون جميع

They recognise this as a necessary proposition. But all these propositions have to be
absolute if the necessity is just taken care of in terms of the truth of the quantifier, rather than by considering the relation between
{NB murā‘a is here explicitly of the necessity. }

the predicate and the subject. If the thing being considered is the quantifier, then the truth of this quantifier is not necessary.

This is because, as they grant, it can be true at different times that every animal is human, and that no animal

is human. So the truth of these two propositions is impermanent from the aspect of its quantifier, and this is the case at every time.

Likewise also when we say

Every human is an animal.

They all recognise this as

{‘All’, so not just one person. }

a necessary proposition. But according to their principles it won’t be a necessary proposition. On the contrary, if we imagine

that no human exists — which is what they say they are doing — then [in that situation] no human

exists.
is an animal. This is by analogy with their statement that

(58) When we say ‘No eclipse is an eclipse’, i.e. an existing eclipse, 
this is a true sentence.

أي كسوف موجود، قول حق. وإذا كان يصح عندهم أن يكون قولنا
If according to them the sentence
كل حيوان أعجم صادقا في وقت من الأوقات، حين ما لا يكون إنسان البينة

(59) Every animal is dumb.

is true at some time, [i.e.] whenever there is no human at all

إنسان حيوان، صدقا دائما، بل إذا يكون صدقا وقتنا ما، فلا تكون هذه
in existence, and since it is true that no human is an animal when there are
no humans, it follows that in this situation the sentence
أن يقال: ليس أحد من الناس حيوان. فلا يكون إذن صدق قولنا: كل

(60) Not one human is an animal.

is true. So the truth of the sentence (57)

إنسان حيوان، صدقا دائما، بل إذا يكون صدقا وقتنا ما، فلا تكون هذه
is not a permanent truth, but rather it is just a truth at a certain time. So this
premise is not

المقدمة ضرورية، بل تكون ممكنة ويستعملونها ضرورية. فكان يجب أن
a necessary proposition but a possible one, and yet they use it as a necessary
one. They ought to

بتمنعوا كون هذه القضايا ضرورية، مع إعتقاد المذهب الذي لهم. وعلى أن لهم
deny that these propositions are necessary, though this is contrary to the

138.15 doctrine of their school. Really what they should say it:

يقولوا: وإن لو أحبنا إلى الإطلاق، راعينا الوقت الذي نتكم فيه. وأما
If we were to accept it as absolute, we would take care of the time in which
we are speaking. In dealing with

في الضرورة والإمكان في رأي شيء آخر، فيكونون قد شوشوا على أنفسهم.
the necessary and the possible, [Aristotle] goes in a different direction, so
these people’s muddle is their own.
{‘alā ‘anfusihim not common, but also at 135.12 above and at ‘Ibūra 118.9. 
[3.1.32] These and similar enquiries divert us from paying attention to the theory that is under discussion, [namely the third mood (30)]. So we are going to put into the enquiries in the Appendices a close study of the other things that need to be said in addition to what we have already said about them. Anyway it is clear that this premise-pair entails a necessity proposition. The same should be said about the fourth mood, where the major premise is an affirmative absoluteness proposition.

{This will be Camestres again.}