Ibn Sina: Qiyās iv.2

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based on the Cairo text ed. Ibrahim Madkour et al.
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iv.2 On syllogisms that are mixtures of possible and absolute in the first figure

[4.2.1] Let us examine the facts about the mixtures of possible and absolute in the first figure. The first mood is:

\{Prior Anal i.15, 33b25. \}

Every C is a B;
(1) and every B is an A with possibility;
so it is evident that every C is an A with possibility.

And the second is:

Every C is a B;
(2) and it’s possible that no B is an A.
So it’s evident that it’s possible that no C is an A.
When the major premise is absolute and the minor premise is a possibility proposition, it is not clear that the syllogism entails a conclusion with any modality. That is because when the minor premise is potentially included in things that satisfy a factual condition, one is not immediately conscious of whether the resulting mode of the conclusion is absolute or possibility, even if in this syllogism the potential inclusion in those things is self-evident.

What is unclear is just whether [the conclusion is] absolute, or possible, or either of these two.

That shows that this premise-pair doesn’t behave like a pair of possibility premises as regards entailing a possibility proposition or an absolute one in a proof.

In the case of the two possibility premises, the potential inclusion in the relevant class doesn’t confuse the mind; in fact the mind judges the question quickly from the fact that the possibly possible is possible. When this claimed conclusion is universally quantified, and in the first figure, one can’t show [the correctness of the syllogism] by conversion or by ecthesis,

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so it has to be shown by absurdity.

[4.2.3] The fact that this syllogism is not perfect is an indication

{This paragraph looks like an interpolation, possibly rough notes by Ibn Sīnā himself that were prematurely included by a copyist. The preceding and succeeding sentences join up.}

If the thing was as he said, when $C$

{NB Nice example of explanation by expansion.}

is included in $B$ in potential — or rather it is included in it in act [on his account] — then it would have been one of all the things that are asserted to be $A$s, and the syllogism would have been a self-evident one, since the minor term is included in act in what is asserted of ‘all $B$s’.

[4.2.4] As for this absurdity: it is built on the fact about propositions
that in themselves are possibly true,

وفي نفسه ولو بالمعنى الأعم لا يعرض من وضع محال بل ما يلزم يلزم،

that if they are broad-possible then no impossibility results from assuming them; so what follows from them must rather follow from them

هو ممكن عام.

as a broad-possible proposition.

وقد أورينا إلى حقيقة ذلك فيما سلف فلا حسن لنا أن نطول الآن

We have talked about the truth of this fact already, and there seems no good reason to draw out

ما جرت به العادة وما دلنا عليه فيما سلف وبالجملة لا يلزم من وضع ما لا

is what we indicated earlier. In brief, no impossibility follows from the assumption of something that is not impossible.

أمر مسمنع، لسنا نقول إنه لا يلزم من وضع الممكن الحقيقي إلا ممكن حقيقي.

This is not to say that only what is strictly possible follows from the assumption of something that is strictly possible.

بل نعني بهذا أنه لا يلزم من وضع الممكن بالمعنى العام المشتمل على المعنى

What we mean is rather that only what is broad-possible follows from the assumption of something broad-possible, where broad-possible is used to cover both

الخاص والمطلق والضروري إلا ممكن بالمعنى العاطفي. فإن الممكن لا يلزم البينه،

what is narrow-possible and what is absolute and what is necessary. In none of these cases does anything impossible doesn’t follow from it.

سواء كان ما وضع للزوم ممكنًا حقيقيًا أو مطلقًا أو ضروريًا فإن ما يلزم الممكن

whether what was assumed for purposes of the entailment was strict possible or absolute or necessary. So what follows the broad possible
is not impossible, in all cases. And for that reason, a falsehood which is not impossible doesn’t entail a falsehood
which is impossible, i.e. a proposition whose contradictory negation is permanently, intrinsically and unconditionally false. If

false proposition does follow, then it is a falsehood which is not impossible.

[4.2.5] So:

\[(5) \text{ When every } C \text{ is a } B \text{ with possibility; and every } B \text{ is an } A \text{ with truth; then we say: Every } C \text{ is an } A \text{ with possibility.}\]

One would think that if Ibn Sīnā accepted Barbara MMM, then he would have deduced this one from it by simply deducing possible from actual. Does he deduce possible from actual? We saw there is no direct evidence of his accepting Barbara MMM as opposed to Barbara QQQ. }

The standard view is that [the conclusion] is likewise

\{This is Prior Analytics i.15, 34a34–34b6. The 'likewise' suggests, surprisingly, that here he takes the possibility in the premise to be broad too. \}

a broad-possibility proposition, and that this is proved by absurdity. The contradiction is created on the basis that if

\[\text{the conclusion is not a possibility statement, then we can suppose that 192.5}\]

[the content of] the conclusion is impossible. To be impossible is to be necessarily not the case.

\{NB This is scholarly interpretation of the text in front of him. Aristotle? \}
So then let us take the contradictory negation of the conclusion, which is

(6) With necessity, not every $C$ is an $A$.

and let us assume that the proposition

\[
\text{آن كل ج ب على أنه موجود، إذ ليس ذلك حالا، فينتج من الشكل الثالث}
\]

(7) Every $C$ is a $B$.

is true (noting that it was not impossible). Then (6) and (7) entail by the third figure

\{In mood Bocardo LXL (Thom). \}

\[
\text{آن بالضرورة ليس كل ب آ، وكان بالإطلاق كل ب آ، هذا حال لم يلزم}
\]

(8) With necessity, not every $B$ is an $A$.

But [we had that] with absoluteness, every $B$ is an $A$. This is impossible.

The impossibility doesn’t result from using an invalid syllogistic mood. Nor is it a consequence of the [possibly] false (7), which is not impossible. So it will come from the other premise, the one that was in doubt.

\{The variant and well-supported text reading al-\text{\textregistered}\text{\textregistered}\text{\textregistered}\text{\textregistered}}\text{\textregistered}\text{\textregistered} looks better to me, but the sense is not affected. \}

Hence that premise (6) is the impossible one.

\{NB Implied use of principle: If conclusion of valid syllogism is impossible, one of the premises must also be impossible. \}

This is what is in the First Teaching, so we mention that the First Teacher denied that this [third figure]

التأليف ينتج الضروري، والآن فقد أنتج منه الضروري، فإنه إن لم يكن ضروريًا.
composition entails a necessity proposition. But here a necessity proposition has been deduced. (And in fact if it was not a necessity proposition it wouldn’t genuinely contradict the impermanent proposition.) So it is clear to you from this that this conclusion is necessary, just as we ourselves have articulated it. It was not mentioned in the First Teaching, where the figures are taught as something necessary {Not confirmed in the manuscripts, but in Ibn Sinā ka-mā ’idā is common and I haven’t seen another ka-mā ’id. But the sense is a bit strange. For translation I ignored the ’id.}
for exercising [the student] and testing [the material]. Don't you see that when you use it, you use it for exercising [the student] and testing [the material]. {’imtihan is usually testing not of the student but of the material - trying it out so as to build up experience and intuitions. He says at 204.11 that the modal syllogisms in Aristotle are mostly for ’imtihan and they are not definitive; see also 208.6. Elsewhere he says ‘irtiyād is the purpose of non-demonstrative syllogisms. I know no other place where he suggests that the predicative figures are just for ‘testing’.}

as entailing a necessity conclusion?

على أنه قد عِمَّك أن تَبْيَن هذا المَحَلَف على هذه الصورة،  من [4.2.7] This use of absurdity can be justified 193.2

غير أن يؤخذ كذب غير مجال الإثبات؛ بل أن يقال: إن كان بالضرورة ليس without any appeal to the device of taking [a consequence of a possible proposition] as [perhaps] false but not impossible. Instead one says:

(9) If with necessity not every $C$ is an $A$;
and every $B$ is an $A$

كلّ $C$ ليس $A$، وكان كلّ $B$ $A$، فواجب من الشكل الثاني أن يكون بالضرورة then by the second figure it has to be that

(10) With necessity not every $C$ is a $B$.

{Second figure Baroco XLL (Thom). This is another proof of 192.2 by contradiction, but taking the other premise. }

ليس كلّ $C$ $B$، وكان ممكنا أن يكون كلّ $C$ $B$، هذا خلف. وقد بينوا But [by the other premise in (5) it was possible that every $C$ is a $B$, and this makes an absurdity. They also showed

{It seems 'they' is Prior Anal i.15, 34b2–6, but if so Ibn Sīnā seems to have a text with different modalities from the standard Greek. }

هذا المَحَلَف بوجه آخر بأن جعلوا الممكنا وَجَدَوا حَتَّى يكون: كلّ $C$ $B$،
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Prior Anal i.15, 34b7

this absurdity in another way, by making the possibility premise a real-world proposition so that the syllogism becomes:

Every $C$ is a $B$;
(11) and every $B$ is an $A$;
so every $C$ is an $A$.

{For his text to make sense, the conclusion should be with possibility.}

وكل $ب$ ، فكل $ج$ ، وكان بالضرورة ليس كل $ج$ ، وما كان يجب
Then [they assumed that] with necessity not every $C$ is an $A$. But there was no need for them to give
{NB Here $mā kāna$ with $mā$ a negation.}

أن يؤثَّر هذا عن الأول.

this argument when they had given the first one.

وقبل بعد هذا في التعلُّم الأول ما معناه: إن المقدمات المطلقة لا يجب أن
[4.2.8] In the First Teaching, it says after this what he has in mind: that 193.9
the absolute premises shouldn’t
{Prior Anal i.15, 34b7}

يلتفت إلى سورها البنتة، حتى يكون إطلاقها أن سورها قد صدق وقتنا ما فلا refer to their quantifier at all, in such a way that their absoluteness is that 193.10
their quantifier is true at some time. So the proposition
{NB Absoluteness on the quantifier. Here it clearly means that the time quantifier is given a particular (in general imaginary) instantiation, which apparently he regards as attached to the subject quantifier.}

يجب أن يقال في المطلق: كل $ج$ $ب$ ، ومنعاته كل $ج$ $ب$ في هذا الزمان.

(12) Every $C$ is a $B$,
in the meaning that every $C$ is a $B$ at such-and-such a time, shouldn’t be used as an absolute proposition.

وذلك لأنه لا منع أن يصدق وقتنا ما أن كل $ج$ متحرَّك إنسان، إذا لم يكن
This is because there is nothing to prevent its being true at some time that every moving thing is a human, if there is
nothing else moving. But the proposition

(13) Every horse can be moving.

is true, and when we say

كلّ متحركٍ يمكن أن يكون إنسانًا أي وقت ما. لم يجب عنه أن كل حيوان

(14) Every moving thing [[can be]] a human (i.e. at such-and-such a
time).

it doesn’t follow from this that every horse

{It has to be ‘Every moving thing is a human’, in spite of the lack of ms sup-
port. Also Ibn Sīnā has missed Aristotle’s argument, which is that with this
interpretation the syllogism can’t be valid, because of the all/none coun-
terexamples. Note also that Aristotle speaks of the counterexample conclu-
sions as ‘following’, as noted by Striker p. 148. }

مكان أن يكون إنسانًا، بل بالضرورة لا شيء من الأفراس إنسان. فإن جعل

can be a human. With necessity, no horse is a human.

(193.15)

بدل الإنسان الحيوان، كان بالضرورة كل فرس حيوان. فهذا ما قال في التعليم

With necessity every horse is an animal, but this is putting ‘animal’ in place of
‘human’. So this is what was said in the First Teaching.

{He seems to miss that this in Aristotle is an application of the all/none
method for proving sterility. }

الأول، فقد جعل هذا سببا لأن يكون مثل هذا الأكبر لا يتألف عنه قياس.

It has been counted as a reason for not constructing any syllogism with a
major premise of this kind.
So it is clearly correct that the use of absolute and impermanent propositions of the kind described above is not good, and that the First Teaching disagrees with it.

{Later on this page he gives his dissenting perspective: we should ask what the speaker intended. }

[4.2.9] Someone might well say:

This syllogism is not [correctly] composed. When the major term stands in this configuration, the middle term in it has to be shared [between the premises]. So [the minor premise] will say that every horse can be moving 'at that time'. But this is false, because at that time there can't be anything that is moving and not human, since every moving thing is human, and when everything moving is human it's impossible that a horse is moving.

Our reply to him is as follows. That doesn't make this possibility proposition false and impossible, where by 'possibility' I mean narrow possibility. [The content of] this sentence is in fact neither
NB Maybe he confuses ‘this sentence can’t be true’ with ‘this sentence asserts that something is impossible’. 

ماهما ولا وجباً فإنه وإن وجد أن لا متجرد هو فرس، فإن ذلك كذلك مهما.
impossible nor necessary. Even if it is true that no moving thing is a horse, 194.10 [the content of the proposition] is not false and impossible.

ولا صدقا حقا ضروريًّا، بل هو أمر بين هذين. فهو الممكن الخاص الذي يقع

على الطلق. وأما الممكن الالّذي لا يقع على الطلق، ويعتبر فيه الزمان المستقبل،
of things that are true absolutely. The kind of possibility which doesn’t hold

فلا يمكن أن يقال إلا وبدل عليه فيه بوجه ما على الزمان المستقبل. فإما أن
can only be used to make statements about what is in some way true in the future. So either

لا يأتلف منه مع هذا الطبع قياس الباّة، وقد ألف، وإنما أن لا يراعي
one can’t [correctly] make the syllogism with that kind of possibility premise

ما ذكرنا. وما علينا من ذلك شيء، فإنّ علينا أن نحكم في كل موضوع بما
taken into account. What we need to take home from this discussion/Aristotle’s 194.15
words (??) is that in every case, when we judge how things

جرب فيه، مع اعتبار أنه إن كان المراد بالمطلق كذا كان كذا. وإن كان
have to be, we do it by interpreting the [speaker’s] intention as being ‘With

المراد بالمطلق شيء آخر، كان له حكم آخر. وما علينا أن نناقش في الأفاظ،
he intended something else with absoluteness, that’s a different content. We have to discuss the expressions,

ونصر على أن قاتلا عنى كذا دون كذا.

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and decide that the speaker means this rather than that.
{NB It all depends on what the speaker means by his premises.}
Now that we have proved (5), we go back to the point that in this demonstration it is shown that the conclusion is a broad-possibility proposition. \[4.2.10\] This was claimed at 192.4 and the proof follows that statement. \[195.1\]

That is correct if we took the absolute premise \[in (5)\] to be the kind of absolute that includes both necessary and non-necessary. But if we took it as the kind of absolute which excludes necessary propositions, [the conclusion] can only be a possibility proposition in the broader meaning. So if someone thought:

\[
\text{فلم يحسن. فإنه ليس إذا لم يكن } \text{ ب بالإمكان الخاص والأخص يجب أن }
\]

that would not be correct. In fact when it is not the case that \(C\) is \(B\) with narrow or narrower possibility, it can’t be true that:

\[\text{NB laysa yajibu here has to mean ‘It can’t be that’.}\]

With necessity no \(C\) is an \(A\). But it might be true that with necessity every \(C\) is an \(A\). This is because:

the things that are incompatible with being [strictly] possible are not the things that are necessarily not true, but rather the things that are necessarily

true and the things that are necessarily not true together. But in this case
too we will prove that the conclusion is a narrow possibility proposition.

أيضا، وذلك لأنه إن كان بالضرورة بعض جـ أ ، ولكن كل جـ ب موجودا،

It is so because

if with necessity some $C$ is an $A$;

(16) let it be true that every $C$ is a $B$;
then with necessity some $B$ is an $A$.

{Here he invokes Disamis LXL (Thom), which Thom MMS p. 73 lists as accepted by Ibn Sīnā and rejected by Aristotle. Note also that Ibn Sīnā’s argument here requires his false rule of possibility.}

فيكون بالضرورة بعض بـ أ ، وكان للـ ب لا بالضرورة.

Then it holds of every $[C]$ that it is not with necessity $[A]$.

{Supposedly the conclusion in (16) is absurd, so the first premise is false, as stated here. The conclusion in (16) is supposed to be contradicting the assumption that the major premise in (5) is narrow-absolute. NB Note here that narrow-absolute would assert that for every $B$, it is not necessarily an $A$.}

وأما أنه هل يجب

[4.2.11] There is a question whether [the conclusion of (5)] should be 195.10
{Are we still assuming that the major premise is narrow-absolute? Cf. 195.18 below.}

أبكون ممكنًا الممكن الذي لا يدخله المطلق حتى ي يكون كل جـ ب بالإمكَان

a possibility proposition with the kind of possibility that doesn’t include [being true in] the absolute, so that it states that every $C$ is a $B$ with narrower possibility,

الأضح ولا إطلاق إجاب البتة، فنقول: ليس ذلك بواجب. فانه يحوز أن

where it is not affirmed at all [of any $C$] that it is $[A]$ absolutely. Our view is that it doesn’t have to be. In fact it could be that

هكون أعم من بـ . فيكون موجودا لكل ما هو بـ بالفعل ولا ليس بـ.

the $A$s include the $B$s and that $[A]$ is true of everything that is a $B$ in act, and of something that is not a $B$.

{NB Here $mī + V$ means ‘something that $V$s’, not the usual ‘whatever $V$s’. But only the context shows this.}
Also it doesn’t have to be that $A$ is true of $B$s only for as long as they are $B$s; but it could still hold before or after [they are $B$s].

So $C$ will be true of a thing even when it is [only] possibly a $B$. But a proposition’s being absolute doesn’t prevent

{The first sentence confirms that the conclusion need not be narrower-possible. The force of the second sentence is unclear since it is unclear whether the absolute is supposed to imply ‘true now’.}

it from being a strict possibility proposition. In fact even if something holds absolutely at a time, and not necessarily, it can

hold at some time with the kind of possibility that is in terms of the future — though not of course if it

holds permanently, which would prevent the truth of the major premise under the aforementioned condition. A way of looking at this that shows it to be correct

{Not a condition but an assumption, that the major premise is narrow absolute.}
was proved for you [earlier], when you learned afterwards that if in place of this impermanent [premise] there was a necessity proposition then the conclusion would be a necessity proposition.

[4.2.12] Now we say: Suppose that in this question of ours, the C was an A permanently for as long as its essence continued to be

{satisfied. Then it is possible for it to be a B, and possible for it not to be a B. We have already said that every

thing that B is true of will have A true of it at a certain time, so it can be the case that when the C becomes a B, A becomes true of it

أمرًا غير دائم وذته موجودة. وقد كان أ هو دائمًا، فتكون أ هو دائمًا ما دام ذاته but not permanently for so long as its essence is satisfied. But [we have supposed that] A is true of it permanently, so A will be true of it permanently for as long as its essence continues to be

 موجودة، ومع ذلك فإنه قد يصير له غير دائم عند أمر ما موجود مع ذاته، satisfied, but nevertheless A will be true of it not permanently and for so long as it exists and its essence is satisfied.

{NB Horrible pun if the text is right: the individual exists (mawjūd) and its essence is satisfied (mawjūd)!}
A won’t be true of the $C$ permanently when the major premise is true. When $A$ is not permanently true of the $C$, that doesn’t prevent {No, he hasn’t shown this, because the major premise doesn’t imply impermanence, though it is compatible with it. At best he can say the conclusion need not hold permanently. }

"A being true of the $C$ both with the narrower possibility and absolutely. In fact $A$ can be true absolutely of the $C$ under a condition which specifies a modality and a consideration different from being true in the future. Thus $A$ can be true of the $C$ with possibility under a condition specifying any future time that we choose for it.

{NB wajha and ‘i’tibār }

[In that case] will this conclusion be true with absoluteness? We say: It need not be,

because it can be that one of the $Cs$ is never a $B$ from the time of its creation to the time of its destruction, and $A$ is true of it only while it is a $B$. Then this $C$

will not have either $B$ or $A$ true of it at all. An example is

(17) Every human can write;
and every writer touches the paper with his pen.

The truth of the conclusion with absoluteness, which would be that it is true

وكل كاتب مات بقلبه الطرس، فليس بإلوائه صدقه بالإطلاق، حتى يصدق
أن كل إنسان مات بقلبه الطرف. فإذا علمت هذا، فطقن عليه سائر الضرور.

that every human touches the paper with his pen, doesn't follow. Now that you know this, try it out with it the other moods.
[With negative premise]

والضرب الذي بعد هذا هو: كـ ﻟـ مـ بـ بالإمكان، ولا شيء من ﻟـ أـ، فلا

4.2.13 The mood which is next after this is:

Every C is a B with possibility;
(18) and no B is an A;
so no C is an A, with broad possibility.

{Celarent, Prior Anal i.15, 34b19.}

شيء من ﻟـ أـ بالإمكان العام. وببيانه على قياس ما قد علمت بالخلف. ومع
Its proof is by a syllogism which you already know, by absurdity. Nevertheless

ذلك فالشهور أن النتيجة هي [لا] شيء من ﻟـ أـ بالضرورة. فقد قيل ما يدل على
the standard view is that the conclusion is that no C is an A with necessity.
In the First Teaching it is said what are the indications that
{NB šay’un should clearly be lā šay’a, with several mss. Also the Greek of
Aristotle has here ‘it is necessary that possibly . . . ’, where the ‘necessary’ is
the necessity of the entailment. }

this is so.

لكن الأولى أن يكون قد وقع في اللفظ تقديم وتأخير، ويكون معناه ليس

4.2.14 But the best [explanation] is that some of the text has got into
the wrong order, and the [intended] meaning is ‘It is not the case that

بالضرورة أـ، ولا في شيء من ﻟـ أـ، لا أنه بالضرورة لا في شيء من ﻟـ أـ. وفرق
between

197.5 with necessity A is in any C’, not that ‘With necessity it is not in any C’.
There is a difference between

قولنا: ليس بالضرورة لا في شيء من ﻟـ أـ، وبين قولنا: بالضرورة ولا في شيء
saying ‘not with necessity in any C’ and saying ‘with necessity not in any
{NB point of usage: does the wa- before lā indicate that this is not the second

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part of a double negative? I think there are counterexamples to this in the
\textit{Ibāra}.\}

\begin{quote}
من جـ كما علمت. وأورد لهذا في التعليم الأول مثالا يدل على أن المراد فيه هو
\textit{C'}, as you know. In the First Teaching [Aristotle] gave an example for this,
which indicates that the intended [meaning] in it is
\begin{quote}
\{Prior Anal i.15, 34b33.\}
\end{quote}
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
أن النتيجة قد تكون ضرورية، لا أنها تكون دائما ضرورية، والمثال لذلك:
that the conclusion ‘can be necessary’, not that it ‘is permanent and neces-
sary’. The example is:
\begin{quote}
\{NB \textit{da’iman} here in the metalanguage, meaning ‘in all cases’? No, I think
it and \textit{darūriyatan} are in apposition. The example refers to times. \}
\end{quote}
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
كل إنسان يمكن أن يفكر أي بالفعل، ولا شيء من المفكّر بغراب، والنتيجة:
Every human can meditate (i.e. in act);
and no meditator is a crow;
and the conclusion is that no person is a crow, which is with ne-
cessity.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
فلا شيء من الناس بغراب، وذلك بالضرورة. وإذا جعل بدل الغراب,
It one puts ‘moving thing’ in place of ‘crow’,
\begin{quote}
التحرك، أنتج نتيجة غير إضطرارية. فإن النتيجة تارة تكون ممكنة، وتارة
it entails a conclusion which is not necessary. Therefore the conclusion [of
this mood] is sometimes a possible proposition and sometimes
\end{quote}
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
تكون ضرورية.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
{Unpick. The conclusion can be only-possibly true or necessarily true, in
examples with true premises. Therefore the premises do not entail a strict-
possibility conclusion or a necessity conclusion. \}
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
وقد بقي علينا أن ننظر في هذه الحدود. فقد قيل في التعليم الأول يجب أن
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
[4.2.15] It remains for us to investigate these terms. It was said in the
First Teaching that
\begin{quote}
\{Prior Anal i.15, 35a2.\}
\end{quote}
\end{quote}
different examples are needed, and this is true. The fact is that the major premise in the first syllogism is a necessary proposition, unless {Why is this an objection? Necessary truths are still truths. At worst one could say that with this example Aristotle could have shown a stronger non-deducibility. Maybe 198.3 hints at an answer: some people read the major premise in (19) as stating narrow absoluteness, i.e. that the proposition is true but not necessarily so. But as the text stands, they are hardly entitled to read it this way. }

An يجعل بدل الفكر المتخيل، سيكون سلب الغراب عن التخيل مما يصح
one puts ‘imaginer’ in place of ‘meditator’, so that it denies that ‘crow’ is true of any of the things that can truly be said to imagine

في وقت ما فتكون أول شيء قد نسينا النصيحة والوصية المذكورة في هذه
at some time. But in the first place this would be to forget the advice and the warnings that were given only
The conclusion. The same applies when both premises are negative and universally quantified. But if the minor premise is taken to be negative

It is proved by converting the negative premise to an affirmative one, and then converting

The next mood

It is possible that no C is a B;
and every B is an A;
entailing: It is possible that no C is an A.

وقد يصدق هنا أن كل متخيل غريب، ولا ينتج عن كل إنسان ممكن أن
it can be true there that every imagining thing is a crow, and it doesn’t entail
be a crow. But when the absolute is taken as including the necessary, the
entailment is as stated

في التعليم الأول. فإنه تارة يكون ضروريًا إن كانت المطلقة في مادة ضرورية،
in the First Teaching. So sometimes [the conclusion] is a necessary propo-
and sometimes it is not a necessary proposition (when the absolute premise is in a matter which is not necessary).

[4.2.16] The next mood

is

بعده وهو أنه ممكن أن لا يكون شيء من ج ب ، وكل ب آ ، ينتج: ممكن
It is possible that no C is a B;
(20) and every B is an A;
entailing: It is possible that no C is an A.

الساعة، وثانياً: أن هذا بعينه ممكن في الضرب الالذي كبره موجبة مطلقة. فإنه
a moment ago. And secondly these same terms could be used in the mood
whose major premise is affirmative absolute: in fact
absolute there doesn’t have to be a syllogism from it. You were taught the reason for that in the discussion of the syllogisms with absolute premises. If the minor premise is taken to be

then the major premise is the one that controls the modality of the conclusion, no doubt about that. If the minor premise is a possibility proposition and the major premise is absolute, then the conclusion is as you learned earlier, and it makes no difference if [the minor premise] is existentially quantified. If the minor premise

is a negative existentially quantified possibility proposition, [the syllogism] is proved by converting to the affirmative in the way you have learned.

Transcription checked 7 Sep 12. Readings checked 17 Oct 12.